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ABSTRACT
Booter services continue to provide popular DDoS-as-a-service
platforms and enable anyone irrespective of their technical ability,
to execute DDoS attacks with devastating impact. Since booters
are a serious threat to Internet operations and can cause significant
financial and reputational damage, they also draw the attention
of law enforcement agencies and related counter activities. In this
paper, we investigate booter-based DDoS attacks in the wild and
the impact of an FBI takedown targeting 15 booter websites in De-
cember 2018 from the perspective of a major IXP and two ISPs. We
study and compare attack properties of multiple booter services
by launching Gbps-level attacks against our own infrastructure. To
understand spatial and temporal trends of the DDoS traffic origi-
nating from booters we scrutinize 5months, worth of inter-domain
traffic. We observe that the takedown only leads to a temporary
reduction in attack traffic. Additionally, one booter was found to
quickly continue operation by using a new domain for its website.
1 INTRODUCTION
TheDDoS threat.Known for at least two decades [15], Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have become a major security
threat to the continuous operation of the Internet [20, 51, 58]. Their
goal is to disrupt services by consumingmore critical resources than
available, e.g., computing power or network bandwidth. Beyond
the web, modern DDoS attacks can overwhelm cloud services [50]
or congest backbone peering links [49]. The motivation for launch-
ing attacks ranges from financial [9, 53], to political [4, 35], cyber
warfare [19, 54], smoke screen for other attack types [33], and even
teenagers attacking their schools [47]. To scale, DDoS amplifica-
tion attacks [42, 43] abuse protocol design (flaws)—e.g., NTP, DNS,
SNMP, and Memcached [2, 14, 37, 42]—where a relatively small
request can trigger a significantly larger response (up to ×50 000).
Spoofed source IP addresses [5, 6, 34, 36] allow traffic to be reflected
to the target [55]. Thus, attacks are increasing in size and sophistica-
tion [1]. A few years back, the largest reported attacks peaked just
below 300 Gbps [39, 40], whereas DDoS attacks have now reached
the Tbps level [3, 26, 37, 58].
Booters as DDoS tool. DDoS-as-a-service providers, also referred
to as booters or stressers, provide a simple web interface and enable
anyone to launch attacks [21, 22] at a low cost of just $0-$5 [10, 11].
On the other end of the scale, booters also claim to offer large-scale
attacks for hundreds of USD [10].
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Booter-related work. An extensive body of research on booters
is available. These studies cover multiple lines of research including
analyses of (1) the booters’ leaked databases [10, 21, 23], (2) booter
attacks [8, 24, 47, 57], (3) victims of booters [38], (4) honeypots
of servers commonly used for performing booter attacks [25, 52],
(5) the usage of these honeypots for attribution purposes [31], (6)
TLS certificates used by booters [32], (7) booter blacklists and their
origins [12, 44, 46, 59], (8) the usage of these blacklists to under-
stand the booter market [45], (9) ethical and legal aspects related to
booters [16, 18], and (10) the impact of law enforcement operations
on booters from a commercial perspective [7, 13].
Our contribution. In this first of its kind study, we shed light on
an FBI led operation of 15 booter domains in December 2018 [29, 56].
Instead of analyzing the effect of a financial intervention, we take
an empirical perspective on the impact of this event on the DDoS
attack traffic observed through the lens of three major networks:
tier-1 and tier-2 ISPs, and a major IXP.
Our study takes as its starting point the use of four popular
booters to attack ourselves. This self-attack provides an up-to-date
picture of booter capabilities and is the first study to investigate
premium (VIP) services and their promises. We derive characteris-
tics of these self-attacks to further investigate tier-1 and tier-2 ISP
and IXP network traffic for DDoS attacks. We study spatial and tem-
poral trends and present the existence and extent of DDoS attacks.
This provides an overview of the current DDoS threat landscape.
Finally, our study focuses on network traffic in the time frame of
the FBI takedown, by applying the characteristics we learn from
our self-attack approach and the investigation of network traffic of
our vantage points. In summary, our major contributions are:
• We investigate the anatomy of a booter attack by launching
attacks against our infrastructure. We were able to observe high
attack traffic volumes of up to 20 Gbps.
• We present an overview of the current Internet threat landscape
through the lens of three major networks: tier-1 and tier-2 ISPs
and amajor IXP.We observe constant DDoS attacks, at thousands
of victims and traffic rates of up to 600 Gbps.
• We seize the unique opportunity to study the effectiveness of an
FBI takedown targeting 15 booter services in December 2018. The
takedown immediately reduced the DDoS amplification traffic
to reflectors. However, it did not have any significant effect on
DDoS traffic hitting victims or on the number of attacks observed.
2 VANTAGE POINTS
Our study is based on three vantage points—amajor IXP, a tier-1 ISP,
and a tier-2 ISP—that provide a unique perspective on DDoS attack
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traffic in the wild. None of the data sets contain any payload. In
addition, we perform active measurements of large sets of domains
within an observatory [17] to identify booter websites.
Major IXP. Anonymized and sampled IPFIX traces captured at a
major Internet Exchange Point (IXP) between Oct. 27, 2018 and Jan.
31, 2019 with 834B flows were made available to us.
Tier-1 ISP. We obtained Netflow traces from all border routers
(ingress only) of a tier-1 ISP. IP addresses are anonymized and
filtered by protocol and port, resulting in 6.6B flows records for
the period of Dec. 12 to Dec. 30, 2018. The trace contains traffic to
i) fixed-line end-users, ii) cellular customers, and iii) transit traffic.
Traffic from end-users and customers was not included.
Tier-2 ISP. The second ISP dataset was anonymized and filtered in
the same way as the tier-1 ISP. However, ingress and egress traffic is
available in this data, meaning that end-user and customer sourced
traffic is included. This results in 470M flow records from Sept. 27,
2018 to Feb. 2, 2019.
IXP Observatory. To study booter properties by performing self-
attacks, we set up and operate an IXP-based DDoS observatory.
It comprises a measurement AS operated by us that is connected
to an IXP via a 10GE link. The AS interconnection consists of
multilateral peerings at the IXP and a transit link over the same
physical interface. Data collection is performed directly at the IXP
platform (sampled) and at the measurement AS itself (unsampled).
DNS andHTTPS observatory. To study the rise and fall of booter
websites, we use weekly crawls of all∼140M .com/.net/.org domains
by obtaining zone files and performing weekly DNS resolutions
and HTTPS website snapshots during January 2018 until May 2019.
The website snapshots enable us to identify booter websites.
3 BOOTER: VICTIM’S PERSPECTIVE
We start by taking a victims’ perspective to study the potential
damage that booter-based DDoS attacks can (a) directly cause to
their target (thereby updating earlier findings on booter attack
characteristics [8, 24, 47, 57]) and (b) the collateral damage to In-
ternet infrastructure caused by carrying attack traffic. We do so by
purchasing services from popular booters to attack our dedicated
measurement infrastructure at an IXP between April and Septem-
ber 2018. This provides us with a unique picture of current booter
service capabilities in the wild: how much DDoS traffic they can
generate in light of powerful Tbps-level attacks. Our study provides
the first look into how reliable the promises of these services are,
e.g., premium membership benefits, promised attack protocols, and
duration. With our measurement infrastructure, we can draw con-
clusions about the DDoS traffic landscape. Ultimately, we utilize
the self-attack to identify attack characteristics to later discover
DDoS attack traffic at our vantage points.
3.1 Self-Attack Approach
Selected booter services. We select 4 popular booters (see Ta-
ble 1) from the booter blacklist [46] based on their Alexa website
rank (booter names anonymized). Two of the selected booters (A
& B) were later seized by the FBI-lead takedown. Three are still in
operation (seized booter A started using a new website after the
takedown). We purchase paid services from all booters including
cheaper (non-VIP) and one more expensive premium package (VIP)
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A ✓ Apr, Aug ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ $8.00 $250
B ✓ Jun-Sep ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ $19.83 $178.84
C Apr-May ✓ ✓ $14.00 $89
D May ✓ ✓ $19.99 $149.99
Table 1: Booters used to attack our measurement AS. Booter
services used for self-attack in Section 3 indicated in bold.
from booter B. We use all booter services to launch attacks against
our measurement infrastructure. However, for the remainder of
this section we only consider attacks with relevant traffic volumes.
These are mostly NTP based amplification attacks, whereas also
CLDAP, DNS, and memcached-based attacks are offered.
Attacking our infrastructure. For our analysis, we passively cap-
ture all traffic of the measurement platform. In addition, we obtain
sampled flow traces of the IXP for traffic directed to our server
and are therefore able to measure attack traffic exceeding the ca-
pacity of 10 Gbps. The BGP router of our measurement platform
announces a /24 IPv4 prefix and peers with a transit provider and
all IXP customers in a multilateral peering configuration via the
IXP’s BGP reflector [41]. This provides us with a similar network
setup compared to small to medium-sized organizations connected
to the Internet. For each attack, we select a new IP out of our /24
prefix to isolate each individual measurement and to not confuse
different attacks within our traffic captures. We perform a post
mortem analysis of the passively measured attacks and derive the
attack traffic volume and their network properties (e.g., number of
servers used for reflection, number of ASes handing over traffic).
Ethical considerations.Weperform controlledDDoS experiments
towards our measurement platform. To comply with measurements
ethics we (a) inform and synchronize with national authorities re-
garding legal/ethical implications of buying booter services, (b) min-
imize payments to booter services by limiting the number of differ-
ent booters and offered service plans we buy (indicated in bold in
Table 1), (c) inform and synchronize with the IXP operator and up-
stream provider about attacks, (d) take precaution that sufficient IXP
network bandwidth is available to minimize the influence on other
IXP members, (e) use an experimental AS with no customer traffic,
(f) utilize an unused /24 prefix that was allocated and announced
only for the experiment, (g) are prepared to shut down the experi-
mental AS and immediately stop attack traffic by withdrawing and
blackholing the /24 in case of unexpected high traffic volumes or
IXP members being negatively effected by our experiment (never
occurred), and (h) minimize the experiment duration.
3.2 Self-Attack Observations
Attack traffic of non-VIP services. We show the results of 10
self-attacks on our measurement platform by non-VIP booter ser-
vices in Figure 1(a). It shows the received traffic volume per second
(y-axis) for each attack. On the x-axis we display the number of
observed reflectors (left plot) together with the number of neigh-
boring ASes from which we receive the traffic (right plot). Each
data point represents one second of a measurement. In terms of
attack traffic volume, we find that during the attacks traffic levels
of up to ∼2000Mbps are prevalent with a mean of 1440Mbps but
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Figure 1: Measurements of Self-Attacks
booters B and A peak at 7078 Mbps. These are the highest traffic
levels reported during a non-VIP booter attack to date [47]. When
we focus on the number of reflectors and peers from which the
traffic is coming, we find that most booter attacks utilize between
∼100 and ∼1000 reflectors distributed over 20–55 peer ASes (avg.
346 and 27 respectively). However, when we instantiate booter B
to use the connectionless LDAP (CLDAP) protocol the number of
reflectors is 3519 distributed across 72 peer ASes. Thus, we learn
that the protocol used for amplification seems to have an effect
on the number of reflectors and IXP members transmitting traffic.
Finally, we observe that NTP amplification attacks are the most
potent attacks delivered by the booters included in our tests.
We next study how the attack traffic is handed over to our AS at
the IXP, i.e., which fraction is received via transit and via peering.
To first study the maximum traffic that can be received via peering
at the present IXP, we perform three attacks solely via IXP peering
and with disabled transit link (indicated as “no transit”) in Figure 4).
This enforces the usage of peering links even if the transit link
would have been a better routing option. In this case, the number
of individual IXP members (peers) sending traffic increases from
below 30 to above 40 when the transit link is deactivated. While the
handover traffic spreads now over more peers, the absence of a full
routing table limits the reachability of our AS when the transit link
is disabled. Consequently, we receive less attack traffic, e.g., the
NTP attack volume of booter A decreases from up to 7 Gbps to less
than 3 Gbps (see Figure 1(a)). For NTP attacks with enabled transit,
we now receive most traffic through the transit link (avg. 80.81%)
compared to the multilateral peerings at the IXP (avg. 19.19%).
Thus, the attack traffic volumes reported in Section 4 captured at
the peering platform of the IXP will likely underestimate the true
attack sizes as the traces do not contain the customers’ transit links.
Attack traffic of VIP services. Booter services advertise higher
priced premium services. For booter B, VIP offerings charge 178.84$
compared to 19.83$ and promise higher attack traffic rates of 80–100
Gbps instead of 8–12 Gbps for non-VIP services. We validate this
claim and launch two VIP attacks from booter B. In Figure 1(b), we
show that the NTP (blue line) and Memcached (red line) attacks
generated traffic rates with a peak of about 20 Gbps and 10 Gbps,
respectively. We configure both attacks to last for 5min. The sudden
drop in attack for the NTP traffic is due to a flapping BGP session
with our transit provider because of the saturation of our measure-
ment interface. The majority of NTP traffic (80.81%) is delivered
by our transit provider, the remaining 19.19% are received over
the IXP peering. Interestingly, 45.55% of the peering traffic (8.73%
over all) is coming from one AS while the median share per peer
is 0.22%. Through the observations of the Memcached attack, we
notice a shift of more traffic being transfered via the IXP peering
(88.59%), while one member alone accounts for 33.58% of the total
attack traffic. We assume that at the time this specific IXP member
was exploited for Memcached amplification attacks. The observed
traffic rates are significantly larger than the non-VIP booter attacks,
but never reach the claimed bandwidth nor the advertised multi-
plication factors. Indeed, we experience only roughly 25% of the
traffic rate compared to that which was advertised.
Amplification overlap. Next we study how the different booters
are related and to what extent they share the same amplifiers. We fo-
cus on NTP amplification attacks and compare the sets of reflectors
used for the attacks. Figure 1(c) depicts 16 independent self-attacks
and the overlap of the NTP reflectors sorted by date. We find stable
set of reflectors for Booter B with moderate churn of around 30%
over a time frame of two weeks (1), which suddenly uses a new
set of reflectors (for booter B from 18-06-12 to 18-06-13). We also
observe a churning set of reflectors over a long period (2). The part
marked by (3) shows same day measurements with a high overlap,
which indicates a stability over short time frames and allows us to
conclude that this booter doesn’t randomly select reflectors from a
larger set of reflectors, but uses the same reflectors for attacks in
this time frame. Moreover reflectors occasionally overlap between
booter services (4). Interestingly, the VIP and non-VIP services use
the same set of reflectors. The difference in attack traffic is gen-
erated by a higher packet rate (5.3M pps compared to 2.2M pps).
Moreover, the number of the reflectors used by booters is fairly
low (in total 868) compared to the globally available set of potential
amplifiers (e.g., 9M potentially usable NTP servers according to
shodan.io on May 12 2019). We conclude that identifying booter
services according to their reflectors is difficult because reflectors
are rotating quickly, are overlapping between different services and
suddenly start using a new set of reflectors. Ultimately, this makes
it impossible to identify specific booter traffic at a later point in
time by using the set of reflectors we learn from the self-attacks.
Takeaway. Booters enable anyone to launch Gbps-scale DDoS for
few dollars only. We measure higher attack volumes than previously
reported (1.4Gbps) [47], even with non VIP-services. We are the first
to report the capabilities of a VIP booter services that peak at about
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Figure 2: Classification of NTP amplification attacks at ISPs and an IXP.
20Gbps. These traffic volumes are sufficient to take down web ser-
vices and significantly disturb the operation of inter-domain links
and Internet infrastructure. We further find NTP-based amplification
attacks to provide the most potent and reliable type of booter attacks.
We believe this is because NTP amplifiers are more widespread and
stable, while Memcached amplifiers focus on fewer networks, which
in turn detect abuse more quickly and mitigate the problem.
4 DDOS AMPLIFICATION TRAFFIC
Next, we study DDoS amplification traffic at our vantage points,
i.e., a Tier-1 & Tier-2 ISP, and an IXP. We focus our discussion
on NTP traffic only, since most reliable booter-spawned attacks
were executed over NTP. This analysis highlights the prevalence of
attack traffic at our vantage points and continues to define filtering
criteria before we study the FBI takedown in the next section.
Optimistic NTP DDoS classification. In our self-attacks we ob-
served amplified NTP packets to have a size of either 486 or 490
bytes (98.62% over all observed packets) due to monlist requests. To
put this in context of a realistic NTP traffic mix, we show the distri-
bution of NTP packet sizes at the IXP in Figure 2(a). We observe
an almost bimodal distribution of 54% of the NTP packets that are
smaller than 200 bytes (likely benign traffic) and 46% that are larger
(likely attack traffic). Thus, we define a threshold of 200 bytes as
an optimistic classification criterion.
NTP amplification traffic in the wild. By applying our classifi-
cation, we find 311K destinations (Tier-1 ISP: 36K , Tier-2 ISP: 95K ,
IXP: 244K ) that receive NTP reflection traffic for the measurement
time (see Section 2). We plot the destination IPs (victims) of the
attack traffic in Figure 2(b). The plot shows the number of unique
amplification sources (y-axis) and the max traffic level in Gbps
over one minute (x-axis). The majority of traffic peaks (y-axis) are
between 5 and 100 Gbps (avg. 2.64 Gbps). Notably, 224 victims re-
ceives more than 100Gbps, 5more than 300Gbps of attack traffic—a
single destination even up to 602 Gbps. Note that only observing
IXP (peering) traffic will underestimate the true attack volumes if
(not captured) transit links are used (see Section 3.2).
Higher traffic rates often involve a higher number of amplifiers
(sources): most destinations receive traffic from hundreds of ampli-
fiers, some even from thousands (avg. 35). Outliers, particularly for
the Tier-1 ISP, receive traffic from up to ∼8500 amplifiers.
We next study the max number of amplifiers per attack target
(unique dest. IP) within one minute bins, shown as CDF in Fig-
ure 2(c) (top). Most targets receive traffic from less than 5 reflectors.
For the Tier-1 and the IXP about 70% receive traffic from less than
10. Interestingly, for the Tier-2, 90% of the targets receive ampli-
fication NTP traffic from less than 10 amplifiers. For comparison,
we depict the CDF of attack traffic peaks within one minute per
target for all 3 data sets in Figure 2(c) (bottom). Only a fraction of
0.09 receives more than 1 Gbps peak traffic and at the IXP we see
158 targets receiving more than 100 Gbps. On the other hand, a
majority of targets receive a negligible amount of traffic.
Conservative NTP DDoS classification.We aim at identifying a
sample of NTP DDoS attacks with a low rate of false positives at the
cost of false negatives. Thus, we take a more conservative approach
by excluding two more cases of false positives, the scanning or
monitoring of NTP monlists [14] and the use of the NTP port by
custom applications. Based on insights from our self-attacks in
Section 3, we introduce two more filtering rules: (a) traffic to the
target has to be larger than 1 Gbps and (b) has to originate from
more than 10 amplifiers, where applying both rules reduces the
number of NTP destinations by 78% ((a) only: 74%, (b) only: 59%).
This results in a data set likely only containing NTP DDoS traffic.
Takeaway. NTP-based DDoS traffic is prevalent at all three vantage
points and can be classified using the proposed criteria. The observed
attacks involve traffic rates of up to 600 Gbps—often generated by a
large number of reflectors—during our observation period. The extent
and size of DDoS attacks we observe raises the question of whether
the takedown of booters has an effect on the attack traffic in general.
5 FBI TAKEDOWN OF 15 BOOTERS
On December 19, 2018 the FBI seized the domains of 15 booter web-
sites (e.g., critical-boot.com or quantumstress.net) [56]. All booters
seized were tested by the FBI prior to the takedown and “the FBI
determined that these types of services can and have caused dis-
ruptions of networks at all levels” [56]. Smaller seizures of single
booter domains had occurred previously, e.g., the seizure of web-
stresser.org with more than 138k registered users by investigators
in the U.S., U.K. and the Netherlands in 2018 [28]. Beyond domain
seizures, booter users and operators can face legal actions [30], e.g.,
the operator of Titanium Stresser was sentenced to years in prison
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Figure 3: Booter domains in the Alexa Top 1M by rank.
in 2017 [27]. Next we focus on studying the effects of seizures on
the overall DDoS attack traffic. That is, do booter take downs result
in a significant reduction in DDoS attack traffic?
5.1 Domain Perspective on Takedown
First, we take a control plane perspective on the available booter
domains. We use weekly snapshots of all .com/.net/.org domains to
identify booter websites by keyword matching following [46] (e.g.,
“booter”, “stresser”, “ddos-as-a-service”). This gives us an overview
of booter domains before and after the takedown. We identified 58
booter .com/.net/.org domains by manually visiting and verifying
each domain matching the keyword search. Using daily snapshots
of the Alexa Top 1M list [48], we rank the identified booter domains
by their median Alexa rank over each month, shown in Figure 3.
Booter domains that were seized in December are highlighted. We
observe the booter domains in the Alexa Top 1M to grow over time.
Seized domains have a high Alexa rank but not the highest among
all booter domains—notably they occasionally still appear in the top
1M list (likely as a result of press reports pointing to those domains).
Thus, despite the seizure of 15 domains, many alternative booter
sites exist. Following this, we select booter domains matching our
keyword search after the takedown. In this way, we identified a
new domain for the seized booter A that became active after the
takedown and entered the global Alexa Top 1M list on December
22—just three days after the seizure of their old domain. The new
domain was registered in June 2018 but remained unused until
the takedown. Our account credentials registered with the seized
domain still work with the new domain (at the time of this writing).
5.2 Traffic Perspective on Takedown
For studying any data plane effects of the recent mass-seizure in
2018 at our vantage points, we do a time series analysis of 122 days
beginning at Sep. 30, 2018 and ending at Jan. 30, 2019, spanning the
seizure of the domains on Dec. 19, 2018. We calculate the following
metrics: (a)wt30/wt40 is a boolean metric indicating whether a one-
tailed Welsh unequal variances test comparing the daily sum of
packets 30/40 days before and 30/40 days after the takedown finds
any significant difference at p = 0.05; (b) red30/red40 is the ratio of
the daily average of sums of packets 30/40 days before and 30/40
days after the takedown. Using these metrics, we investigate any
combination of suspicious protocol ports (NTP, memcached, DNS,
etc.) as source or destination port (to or from reflectors) for ingress
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Figure 4: Selected significant changes in traffic before and af-
ter the takedown;wt30/wt40: significant lower packet counts
at p = 0.05 when comparing 30/40 days before and after the
takedown; red30/red40: ratio of dailymean 30/40 days before
and 30/40 days after the takedown.
and egress traffic. We start with a discussion of traffic to DDoS
reflectors, as we found significant changes for this type of traffic.
Memcached traffic to reflectors. Memcached remains a popular
attack vector due to its unsurpassed amplification factor. As Mem-
cached is a AS-internal object caching daemon, it is not expected
to appear in regular inter-domain traffic. Consequently, we assume
that any UDP traffic with Memcached target port number 11211 is
traffic flowing to a DDoS memcached reflector and accept possible
noise added by scanning or other applications using the port. We
investigate the number of packets to memcached reflectors for the
IXP vantage point in Figure 4 (top). A statistically significant reduc-
tion can be found for the 30 day window (wt30) as well as for the 40
day window (wt40). The average daily number of packets after the
takedown is 22.50% (red30) and 27.72% (red40) compared to before.
A comparable and significant reduction was found for the tier-2
ISP as well (wt30/wt40 =True, red30 = 7.34%, red40 = 4.99%).
NTP traffic to reflectors. NTP is a leading amplification vector
due to the high number of open NTP reflectors. We compare traffic
to NTP reflectors under the assumption that any traffic with UDP
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Figure 5: Systems under NTP DDoS attack per hour.
target port 123 is a spoofed packet for triggering an attack, i.e., in-
cluding false negatives such as legitimate NTP requests. Even when
accepting this unquantifiable amount of noise, we find significant
reductions in traffic to NTP reflectors for the ISP vantage point (see
4, middle). After the seizure, the number of packets falls to 39.68%
(red30) and 26.97% (red40) respectively. The same is true for the IXP
vantage point (wt30/wt40 =True, red30 = 22.5%, red40 = 27.72%).
DNS traffic to reflectors. Similiar to NTP andMemcached, DNS is
abused for DDoS as a reflector. However, separating the comparably
large share of legitimate from illegitimate requests is difficult. Thus,
our results for DNS request packets at the Tier-2 ISP’s vantage
point (Fig. 4, bottom) are not as visually impressive as for other
vectors. Nevertheless, we find a statistically significant reduction
in traffic levels in both time windows (wt30/wt40). In the week after
the seizure, DNS requests fall to a global minimum. The overall
reduction is larger than 20% (red30/red40). No reduction could be
found for the IXP vantage point.
No significant reduction in attack volumes or number of sys-
tems attacked. A surprising finding of this work is that we find
significant reductions for traffic flowing to DDoS reflectors, but
no significant reduction in attack traffic from reflectors to victims,
or in the number of systems attacked. In order to minimize the
probability of false conclusions with respect to this finding, we use
the knowledge of NTP DDoS traffic characteristics from Section
4 to compose a filter for the number of systems under attack (see
Fig. 5). We isolate all IPs receiving NTP traffic with packets > 200
bytes packet size from more than ≤ 10 hosts with more than 1 Gbps
traffic peak. We do not find a significant reduction in the number
of systems attacked (wt30/wt40).
Takeaway. The traffic patterns observed show a correlation with the
FBI seizure. We find significant reductions in DDoS traffic to possible
DNS, NTP, and Memcached reflectors around the takedown operation.
Nevertheless, we could not find any significant reduction in traffic from
reflectors to victims. To exclude false positives, we use more reliable
filters for NTP DDoS learned from our self-attacks, which shows no
significant reduction after the takedown. We conclude that seizing the
front-end of Booter services does not improve the situation for DDoS
victims, as the underlying infrastructure of reflectors remains online
and can be utilized by third-parties without disruption.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies for the first time the effect of booter-based DDoS
attacks through the lens of a major IXP, a tier-1 ISP, and a tier-2
ISP—with a focus on the effects of an FBI takedown of 15 booter
websites in Dec. 2018. By purchasing attacks against our own infras-
tructure from 4 popular booters, we study booter capabilities. The
attack traffic levels generated by cheaper non-VIP services are con-
siderably higher than reported in related work (avg. 1.4 Gbps) [47].
We are the first to report the capabilities of a premium (VIP) booter
service that peaks at 20Gbps while promising 60-80Gbps. In our
data sets, we observe NTP-based DDoS attack traffic to be prevalent
at all three vantage points. The attacks observed involve substan-
tial traffic rates of up to 600Gbps during our observation period.
To study if booter takedowns of law enforcement agencies help
to reduce the attack traffic, we analyze the effect of an FBI-led
mass-seizure of 15 booter domains in Dec. 2018 on NTP, DNS, and
Memcached-based DDoS attacks. We reveal that the takedown im-
mediately had an effect on the DDoS amplification traffic especially
reflectors. However, it did not have any significant effect on DDoS
traffic hitting victims or on the number of attacks observed. This
shows that only seizing the front end is not enough as the under-
lying infrastructure of reflectors remains online and is utilized by
third parties. Moreover, we found at least one booter to become ac-
tive under a new domain shortly after the seizure, while the number
of booter service domains in total increased over the measurement
period despite the seizure. Our study aims to inform network op-
erators to better understand the current threat-level, but also law
enforcement agencies to recognize the need of additional efforts to
shut down or block open reflectors. Since our study is limited to
technical parameters, the question arises whether this is sufficient
to assess the health of the booter ecosystem. This motivates the
need to better study the effects of law enforcement on the booter
economy, e.g., on infrastructures, financing, or involved entities.
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